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TOPICS IN ECONOMIC THEORY II ‡
Information and Communication in Organizations†
By Inga Deimen and DezsÖ Szalay*
Information is vital for good  decision mak-
ing in organizations. However,  decision makers 
often have to rely on others to provide them with 
information. Therefore, information has to travel 
through the organization to the  decision maker.
Our model highlights two potential reasons 
why the quality of information can diminish on 
its way to the  decision maker. Firstly, individuals 
who see the information draw inferences from it, 
that is they process the information statistically 
and reduce the informational content to what is 
relevant to themselves only. This is a completely 
 nonstrategic procedure in which the individual 
forms a posterior expectation from the observed 
facts. Since the posterior expectation, hence-
forth the inference, is all that matters to the 
individual, not more than this statistical piece 
of information gets passed on to the  decision 
maker. Secondly, there may be strategic reasons 
to withhold information from  decision makers 
because there may be disagreement about how 
to use the information in  decision making.
In this paper, we identify a benchmark in 
which the second component is absent in equi-
librium. In particular, we take a constrained 
information design perspective (see Kamenica 
and Gentzkow 2011 for an analysis of the com-
pletely unconstrained persuasion  problem), 
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where a designer controls the noise in the obser-
vations of the individual who gets to see the 
information first—the sender. The designer’s 
objective is to maximize the sum of both indi-
viduals’ payoffs, taking into account that the 
sender gets to see the information first, before 
he passes it on to the second individual—the 
receiver—who takes the decision that affects 
both individuals’ payoffs. Noise is the only 
instrument available to the designer to influence 
 decision making.
It turns out that controlling the noise in the 
sender’s observations is a surprisingly powerful 
tool. The choice of information is quite similar to 
a  risk-sharing problem within the organization. 
When both individuals face equal uncertainty 
ex ante and are sufficiently averse to errors in 
the  decision-making process, then the designer’s 
optimal choice of information structure equal-
izes the residual uncertainty that the sender and 
the receiver face. Moreover, there is no disagree-
ment on the use of the statistically processed 
information between the sender and the receiver. 
Hence, given the optimal information, there is 
no way to improve the  decision-making proce-
dure: a reallocation of  decision-making rights 
from the receiver to the sender would not affect 
the optimal  decision rule. In other words, the 
optimal provision of information and the allo-
cation of authority are substitutes in our model.
The idea of information processing in orga-
nizations has already been discussed by Cyert 
and March (1963), preceding the seminal paper 
by Crawford and Sobel (1982) on the strategic 
transmission of information. We emphasize that 
the informational loss in the present model is of 
a different nature than in the Crawford and Sobel (1982) model. The only loss is due to a statis-
tical processing of the information because 
our sender’s conditionally optimal action just 
depends on an aggregate of the observed signals. 
In companion work (Deimen and Szalay 2019), 
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we study the information design problem when 
the sender has reasons to strategically withhold 
information as in Crawford and Sobel (1982). In 
Deimen and Szalay (forthcoming), we consider 
a  sender-receiver game and identify situations in 
which the sender never has incentives to acquire 
information that would misalign his interests 
from the receiver’s at the communication stage.
I. Model
We consider a strategic interaction between 
three parties in fixed roles, a sender (he), a 
receiver (she), and a designer. For example, the 
sender and the receiver could correspond to divi-
sions of a firm while the designer could corre-
spond to the headquarters of the firm. A decision 
x ∈ ℝ needs to be taken that affects the payoffs 
of all three parties. The sender has preferences 
described by
  u s (x, η) = − ℓ (x − η) ; 
the receiver has preferences
  u r (x, ω) = − ℓ (x − ω) . 
The loss function  ℓ (q) is symmetric around its 
minimizer,  q = 0, twice differentiable, and at 
least as convex as the quadratic function. More 
precisely, we assume that the  Arrow-Pratt mea-
sure of the relative curvature of the loss func-
tion satisfies  q ℓ ″ (q) / ℓ ′ (q) ≥ 1 for all  q ≠ 0 . 
In addition,  ℓ rises sufficiently slowly to make 
expected utility  well defined.1 The ideal poli-
cies of the players are given by  x r (ω) = ω and 
 x s (η) = η for the receiver and the sender, 
respectively. The realizations of  ω and  η are 
unknown at the outset. The designer is interested 
in maximizing the joint surplus
  u d (x, η, ω) = − ℓ (x − η) − ℓ (x − ω) . 
The decision process is organized as follows. 
The sender gets to observe noisy signals
  s ω = ω +  ε ω and  s η = η +  ε η , 
where  ε ω and  ε η are noise terms that are indepen-
dent of each other and of  ω and  η . The receiver is 
1 Examples include  ℓ (q) =  q 2n for  n ∈ ℕ .
in charge of making the decision  x . The designer 
can influence the interaction by choosing the 
information structure, that is the amount of noise 
in the sender’s signals,  σ  ε ω  2 and  σ  ε η  2 (the variances 
of the noise terms  ε ω and  ε η ). Since it turns out 
to be without loss of generality, we focus on 
the case  σ  ε ω  2 = 0. The choice of the informa-
tion structure is publicly observable. However, 
the realizations of signals  s ω and  s η are privately 
observed by the sender. The sender communi-
cates with the receiver, who finally chooses  x . 
There is no cost of sending messages, and the 
receiver is unable to commit to the action  x as 
a function of the information she receives, so 
communication is modeled as cheap talk in the 
sense of Crawford and Sobel (1982).
We assume that  Y =  (ω, η,  ε ω ,  ε η ) follows a 
joint Normal distribution. Moreover, we assume 
that all the differences in preferences are unsys-
tematic and random. That is, players agree 
ex ante but may disagree when given new infor-
mation. Formally, we have  E[ Y ] =  0 ¯. While the noise variances are the designer’s choice, the 
variances of  ω and  η are exogenously given and 
denoted by  σ 2 . To make the game interesting, we 
assume that the sender’s and the receiver’s ideal 
actions are positively correlated with coefficient ρ ∈  (0, 1) and  cov (ω, η) = ρ  σ 2 .
II. The Sender’s Inferences
Suppose that the designer has chosen an 
information structure. What action would the 
sender ideally want to induce and, more impor-
tantly, what part of the observed information is 
the sender willing to share with the receiver? 
The sender’s preferred choice given the signals 
s ω and  s η is his posterior mean, which is a linear 
function of the signals:
  x s ( s ω ,  s η ) = E [η  |  s ω ,  s η ] =  α s  s ω +  β s  s η , 
where  α s and  β s are weights that can be calcu-
lated from the underlying parameters and that 
are independent of  s ω and  s η .2 Note that, if the 
receiver obtained the signals directly, she would 
generally choose a different action than the 
sender,  x r ( s ω ,  s η ) = E [ω  |  s ω ,  s η ] .
Once the sender has updated the informa-
tion he communicates with the receiver, that is 
2 Details can be found in the online Appendix.
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he sends a message to the receiver. Naturally, 
the informativeness of the messages received 
depends on the level of conflict between the 
players. In our setup, the conflict of interest 
arises endogenously as a function of the infor-
mation structure that is chosen. Moreover, 
given that there is an underlying disagreement 
between the players, the sender is only partially 
willing to share his observed information with 
the receiver. That is, instead of fully revealing all 
the signals, he is at most willing to share his pos-
terior optimum given the information. In partic-
ular, as is formally shown in Deimen and Szalay (forthcoming), any communication equilibrium 
is essentially equivalent to an equilibrium where 
the sender only communicates a message about
  θ ≡ E [η  |  s ω ,  s η ] . 
Suppose for now that the sender would com-
municate  θ  nonstrategically to the receiver. What 
does the receiver learn and what action would 
she want to take? The receiver’s conditionally 
optimal action is the posterior expectation given 
the information  θ ,3 that is
  x r (θ) = E [ω  | θ] =  cov (ω, θ)  _var (θ)  ⋅ θ. 
The conditional expectation corresponds to the 
linear regression, where the slope
  c ≡  cov (ω, θ)  _
var (θ)  ≡  
C _
V
measures the usefulness of information  θ for the 
receiver relative to its usefulness for the sender.
LEMMA 1: For  σ  ε ω  2 = 0 , we have  C = ρ  σ 2 . 
Moreover,  V is a decreasing function of  σ  ε η  2 , that 
takes maximal value  ¯  V =  σ 2 for  σ  ε η  2 = 0  and 
minimal value  V ¯ =  ρ 2  σ 2 for  σ  ε η  2 → ∞. 
By construction of the conditional expecta-
tion  θ, we have  cov (η, θ) = V for all informa-
tion structures. Therefore, information that is 
more useful to the sender results in a higher vari-
ance  V. Intuitively, the least useful signal to the 
sender is when he just learns about the receiver’s 
3 Since the Normal distribution is closed under linear 
combinations,  (ω, η, θ) are also jointly Normal distributed.
ideal action  ω ; the most useful signal is the one 
that reveals the state  η perfectly. The bold hor-
izontal line in panel B of Figure 1 depicts the 
feasible set described in Lemma 1.
On top of the intrinsic usefulness, the noise in 
the sender’s signal creates or resolves conflicts 
between the sender and the receiver. In particu-
lar, if the sender learns his ideal action,  η, then 
the receiver would like to react to changes in  θ 
with a propensity  c = ρ < 1. In contrast, if the 
sender just learns the receiver’s ideal action, ω, the receiver would like to overreact by 
c = 1/ρ > 1. We illustrate the conflict between 
the sender and the receiver for  c < 1 in panel 





xr (θ) = cθ 
xs (θ) = θ





Figure 1. Conflicts and Feasibility
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III. Optimal Information
We now address the designer’s problem of 
choosing an optimal information structure. What 
information should the sender get to observe? 
Since the sender’s posterior expectation  θ aggre-
gates the sender’s information into a single sta-
tistic, the designer faces a  trade-off: the sender’s 
information can be relatively more useful to 
the sender or the receiver, but not to both. We 
approach the designer’s problem in two steps. 
We first analyze the problem purely from this 
statistical point of view, that is we assume that 
the sender’s posterior expectation can be pub-
licly observed by the receiver. In a second step, 
we add strategic information transmission to the 
picture.
A. Public Inferences
If the receiver observes the sender’s inference θ, then she follows the policy  x r (θ) = c ⋅ θ, 
resulting in a loss of  ℓ (cθ − ω) for the receiver 
and a loss of  ℓ (cθ − η) for the sender. We 
note that the arguments of the loss functions, 
z ≡ cθ − ω and  t ≡ cθ − η , are linear combina-
tions of Normal variates, hence Normal as well. 
Let  z ̃ ≡  cθ − ω _ 
 √  var (cθ − ω)  and  t ̃ ≡  
cθ − η _ 
 √  var (cθ − η)  
denote the standardized arguments that follow 
a standard Normal with density  ϕ ( ⋅ ) . We can 
write the designer’s problem as
  max 
V∈ [ V ¯, ¯  V ] 
 −∫ ℓ (z) ϕ ( z ̃) d z ̃− ∫ ℓ (t) ϕ ( t ̃ ) d t ̃ . 
Both expected losses depend negatively on a 
residual variance that measures the residual 
uncertainty after using  θ optimally from the 
receiver’s perspective. Naturally, the residual 
uncertainty for the receiver is
(1)  var (z) =  σ 2 −  c 2 V = var (ω  | θ) , 
where the second equality holds because  θ is 
used optimally from the receiver’s perspective. 
In contrast,  θ is in general not used optimally 
from the sender’s perspective. The residual 
uncertainty that the sender faces when  θ is used 
according to the policy  x r (θ) is
(2)  var (t) =  σ 2 −  (2C −  c 2 V) , 
which differs from  var (η  | θ) =  σ 2 − V unless 
the optimal choices  θ and  cθ are identically 
equal to each other,  c = C/V = 1 .
We can now characterize the optimal informa-
tion structure.
PROPOSITION 1: If the loss function satis-
fies  q ℓ ″ (q) / ℓ ′ (q) > 1 for  all  q ≠ 0, then the 
designer’s problem of choosing an optimal infor-
mation structure has a unique solution, which is 
given by  V ⁎ = ρ σ 2 . If the loss function satisfies 
q ℓ ″ (q) / ℓ ′ (q) = 1 for  all  q ≠ 0 (correspond-
ing to the quadratic case), then any information 
structure with  σ  ε ω  2 = 0 is optimal.
The designer’s problem resembles a risk-shar-
ing problem. Both players dislike higher resid-
ual uncertainty and an increase of  V increases 
the residual uncertainty the receiver faces, equa-
tion  (1) , and decreases the residual uncertainty 
the sender faces, equation  (2) . For a sufficiently 
convex loss function, the problem has a unique 
maximum at the point where the residual uncer-
tainty for both players is equalized because the 
marginal loss of increasing the residual uncer-
tainty for one player outweighs the marginal 
benefits for the other player. For the quadratic 
loss function, the designer’s payoff becomes lin-
ear in the residual variances, which implies that 
the receiver’s loss from increasing  V just offsets 
the sender’s gain and thus the sum of their pay-
offs becomes independent of  V .
B. Private Inferences
We now consider the case of main inter-
est where the sender has private information 
about  θ and thus is free to make up any state-
ment he likes. As is standard in the literature, 
we assume that the sender and the receiver are 
able to coordinate on the ex ante Pareto optimal 
equilibrium in the communication game. Let 
 m  :  ℝ + 2 ×  ℝ 2 →  denote the sender’s mes-
sage strategy, where   is sufficiently rich. Let 
the receiver’s strategy be  x  :  ℝ + 2 ×  → ℝ . 
The designer’s optimal choice of the informa-
tion structure eliminates conflicts in a certain, 
well-defined sense.
PROPOSITION 2: The unique optimal infor-
mation structure chosen by the designer satis-
fies  V ⁎ = ρ  σ 2 . The Pareto best equilibrium of 
the  ensuing  continuation game involves fully 
VOL. 109 549INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION IN ORGANIZATIONS
 revealing communication about  θ,  m ⁎ (θ) = θ 
for all  θ , and the receiver takes the sender’s 
advice at face value,  x ⁎ (m) = m for all  m .
The proof of the proposition is a straight-
forward combination of our preceding results 
and a verification that the described strategies, 
together with appropriate receiver beliefs, con-
stitute an equilibrium of the communication 
game. Since the designer cannot improve upon 
its payoff compared to the case where  θ is pub-
lic information, the situation corresponds to 
an optimum if this payoff is reached. Suppose 
the receiver believes that the sender plays the 
message strategy  m (θ) = θ for all  θ. Then, 
his best reply is the action strategy  x ∗ (m) = 
c ∗ ⋅ m = m for all  m. The sender, who antic-
ipates this policy, induces his ideal policy by 
being fully revealing about  θ, so the construction 
is indeed an equilibrium. Note that in this equi-
librium the strategies of both players are linear 
functions.
COROLLARY 1: Under the unique optimal 
information structure, all parties’ expected pay-
offs are the same as if the sender were given the 
right to choose the action  x directly.
Since  x ⁎ ( m ⁎ (θ) ) = θ for all  θ , the send-
er’s optimal policy is implemented for all  θ . 
Consequently, whether the sender communi-
cates with the receiver or whether the sender is 
given the right to choose the policy, the expected 
payoffs of all parties involved are exactly the 
same.4 Note that this would generally not be 
the case for exogenously given information, see, 
for example, Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek (2008). The intuition is that, for equal margin-
als, an information structure that equalizes resid-
ual uncertainty automatically eliminates any 
bias in the use of information. Note that there 
remains a conflict between sender and receiver 
with respect to using the underlying signals,
4 Note that the multiplicity of solutions for the quadratic 
loss case if  θ is public information is eliminated because 
fully revealing communication now requires that  c ∗ = 1 .
 s ω and  s η . However, under the optimal informa-
tion structure, the sender’s recommendation  θ 
and the difference  ω − θ become uncorrelated. 
Put differently, the optimal information structure 
orthogonalizes the conflict between the players 
and the  recommendation and hence removes any 
impediments to communication.
Even if the designer or the receiver had the 
right to constrain the sender’s discretion under 
delegation, they would not want to make use of 
this right. The sender’s optimal choice is neces-
sarily a function of his inference  θ only, and the 
sender uses this inference in the receiver’s best 
interest. Hence, communication is in fact unsur-
passed by any form of delegation, even optimal 
delegation.
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